The Plaza Accord of 1985 was an agreement between the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom to intervene in currency markets to depreciate the U.S. dollar. The goal was to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, particularly with Japan, by making American exports cheaper and Japanese imports more expensive.
Under the agreement, Japan and other countries agreed to coordinate efforts to weaken the dollar by selling it in foreign exchange markets. This led to a sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen and German deutsche mark. While it temporarily helped reduce the U.S. trade deficit, the yen’s rapid rise also contributed to Japan’s asset bubble in the late 1980s, which later collapsed in the early 1990s, leading to Japan’s “Lost Decade.”
And regarding China…
Yes, there’s an informal parallel between Japan’s post-Plaza financial strategy and China’s massive purchases of U.S. Treasuries over the last few decades.
Key Comparison:
1. Japan in the Late 1980s: After the Plaza Accord forced yen appreciation, Japan faced slowing exports and an influx of capital. To sustain growth, it invested heavily in U.S. assets, particularly real estate and stocks, leading to a bubble that later burst.
2. China Since the 1990s: Instead of letting the yuan appreciate too quickly, China recycled its trade surplus by buying U.S. Treasuries, keeping the yuan stable and interest rates low in the U.S. (which fueled American consumer spending).
Outcome Differences:
• Japan’s bubble collapsed in the 1990s, leading to stagnation.
• China’s strategy avoided a Plaza-style shock, but U.S. reliance on China for debt financing created geopolitical and financial tensions, especially as China has reduced Treasury purchases in recent years to diversify its reserves.
In both cases, the U.S. trade imbalance led to financial interdependence, but China learned from Japan’s mistakes, choosing gradual financial shifts over abrupt currency revaluation.